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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 GUATEMALA 4481

DEPARTMENT PASS USAID AND ACDA

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX, GR
SUBJECT: FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED SECURITY ASSISTANCE ASSESSMENT:
GUATEMALA

REF: STATE 167901

THE NUMBERING OF THE PARAGRAPHS WHICH FOLLOW IS KEYED TO THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN REFTEL.

3.A(1) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. SO LONG AS THE MILITARY REMAIN THE MOST INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL FORCE IN GUATEMALA, OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS WILL CONTINUE TO COLOR MANY ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, LINKAGES WITH THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY ASSUME DISPROPORTIONATE IMPORTANCE FOR MAINTAINING COOPERATIVE ATTITUDES NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES ARE TO MAINTAIN MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS SUPPORTIVE OF A BROAD RANGE OF U.S. OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, ARMS RESTRAINT AND REASONABLENESS ON THE BELIZE ISSUE, AND TO ASSURE CONTINUED
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GUATEMALAN PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE HEMISPHERIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

3.A(2) PERCEIVED SECURITY THREAT AND STRATEGIES. BELIZE'S POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT, PARANOIA ABOUT CUBAN INTENTIONS AND CONCERN ABOUT LEFT-WING AGITATION AND TERRORISM ARE THE PRIMARY SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE GOG. THEMOST IMMEDIATE EXTERNAL

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THREAT SEEN BY THE GOG IS THAT FROM BRITISH FORCES IN BELIZE
IN THE SENSE THAT BRITISH DEFENSIVE FORCES, OPERATING FROM
TERRITORY CLAIMED BY GUATEMALA, ARE CONSIDERED "OFFENSIVE"
FORCES HERE. SEMANTICS ASIDE, THE GOG ASSUMES A GUATEMALAN
STRIKE AGAINST BELIZE (A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY SHOULD THE U.K.
GRANT INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT FIRST REACHING A SETTLEMENT WITH
GUATEMALA) WOULD PROMPT U.K. RETALIATIOON IN THE FORM OF U.K.
EFFORTS, AT MINIMUM, TO NEUTRALIZE GUATEMALAN STAGING AREAS.
A HARRIER ATTACK AGAINT THE GUATEMALAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
IS ONE SUCH APPREHENSION, AND IS IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
GOG'S QUEST FOR A SUITABLE INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. (PRESTIGE
CONSIDERATIONS, HOWEVER, MAY BE A MORE IMPORTANT FACTOR.) SOME
MILITARY ALSO SEE A LONG-TERM POTENTIAL THREAT GROWING OUT OF
SALVADORAN OVER POPULATION. CUBA FIGURES PROMINENTLY,
IF UNSPECIFICALLY, IN GOG STRATEGIC THINKING -- EXTERNALLY AND
INTERNALLY. MUCH OF THE PROFESSED CONCERN ABOUT BELIZE INVOLVES THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN ACTIVE CUBAN ALLIANCE WITH THE PARTISANS OF BELIZEAN

INDEPENDENCE, LEADING TO CUBAN INCURSIONS OR INFILTRATION INTO
GUATEMALAN TERRITORY VIA BELIZE. THE GOG SEES ITSELF A PARTICULAR
CUBAN TARGET BECAUSE GUATEMALA PROVIDED A STAGING AREA IN
1961 FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. THE GOG BELIEVES CUBA IS
CLOSELY ALLIED TO INTERNAL INSURGENTS WHO, AFTER HAVING BEEN
LARGELY SUPPRESSED IN THE LATE 1960'S, ARE DEMONSTRATING INCREASING
SELF-CONFIDENCE, PARTICULARLY IN REMOTE NORTHWESTERN GUATEMALA.
SEE 3.A(4) FOR DISCUSSION OF MILITARY STRATEGY.
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3.A(4) MISSION VIEW OF THREAT. WE VIEW THE POSSIBILITY OF
CONFLICT WITH THE U.K. OVER BELIZE AS REAL. THE EXTREMIST
LEFT (PARTICULARLY THE EGP, POSSIBLY IN ALLIANCE WITH COMMUNIST
DISSIDENTS) HAS THE CAPACITY TO STRIKE SUCCESSFULLY ON SMALL SCALE
ANYWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. MUCH DEPENDS ON ITS WILLINGNESS TO OBSORB
LOSSES. THE SALVADORAN THREAT IS HIGHLY REMOTE, FROM OUR LIMITED
PERSPECTIVE. CUBAN MEDDLING IN AFRICA LENDS SOME SUPPORT TO
GUATEMALAN FEARS THAT CUBA WOULD SEEK TO EXPLOIT A BELIZE
"VACUUM," BUT THIS APPREHENSION APPEARS EXAGGERATED. HOWEVER,
CUBAN SUPPORT FOR LEFTIST INSURGENTS HAS A HISTORICAL BASIS
IN GUATEMALA AND WE EXPECT CUBA TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE
THE FORMATION OF A COHESIVE EXTREMIST MOVEMENT SEEKING TO EXPLOIT
DISCONTENT, PARTICULARLY IN RURAL AREAS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 GUATEMALA 4481

DEPARTMENT PASS USAID AND ACDA

3.A(4) TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT GOG CONSIDERS SUITABLE. THE GOG MAINTAINS AN ARMY ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO TWO PLUS (2 PLUS) U.S. LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES. THE EQUIVALENT OF TWO REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALIONS BASED IN THE CAPITAL FULFILLS A "PALACE GUARD" FUNCTION. REMAINING ARMY FORCES ARE DEPLOYED IN BATTALION-SIZED GARRISONS -- ONE IN EACH OF THE COUNTRY'S SEVEN MILITARY ZONES, BASES INCLUDIN ONE FACING BELIZE. SMALLER COMPANY/PLATOON-SIZED ELEMENTS ARE DETACHED ON A ROTATING BASIS TO OUTLYING AREAS. THERE IS A SPECIAL RANGER UNIT IN THE AREA WHERE GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN MOST ACTIVE, AND A SEPARATE PARACHUTE BATTALION IS AVAILABLE TO REINFORCE ANY OF THE ZONES. THERE IS ALSO A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY POLICE FORCE. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THE ARMY SHOWS THE FLAG, PROVIDES SERVICES, IS PREPARED TO BAK UP POLICE IN MAINTAINING ORDER AND ENGAGES IN CIVIC ACTION. THE ARMY DOES NOT TRAIN TO MASS LARGE-SCALE FORCES; ITS ABILITY TO DKISENGAGE FORCES IN MILITARY ZONES ON A MORE THAN LIMITED BASIS IS SUSPECT. IT TRIES TO MAINTAIN CAPITAL CITY FORCES AT FULL STRENGTH; PERSONNEL LEVELS IN OTHER AREAS FLUCTUATE.

AIR FORCE (BASED IN GUATEMALA CITY) AND NAVY (ONE
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BASE ON EACH COAST) ARE SUBORDINATE TO THE ARMY. AIR FORCE IS CAPABLE OF LIMITED CLOSE-AIR SUPPORT WITH A-37'S. LIGHT TRANSPORT ELEMENTS HAVE ROUTINE MISSION OF RESUPPLYING ARMY BASES AND SUPPORTING AGRICULTURAL COLONIZATION PROJECTS, ARE CAPABLE OF LIMITED AIR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, AND FURNISH CHARTER TRANSPORT TO PRIVATE PARTIES. NAVY HAS LIMITED COASTAL PATROL ROLE.

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GOG BELIEVES ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE IS GENERALLY SUITABLE
FOR COUNTRY NEEDS. ONE EXCEPTION IS LACK OF AN AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITY; ANOTHER MAY BE DESIRE TO INCREASE PATROL BOAT
COMPLEMENT. PRESSURE FOR MODERNIZATION, HOWEVER, IS IMPORTANT,
IF MAINLY FOR PRESTIGE REASONS. MILITARY DOES NOT APPEAR TO DO
MUCH ADVANCE PLANNING ABOUT PROCUREMENT. WHEN IT DECIDES IT
WANTS SOMETHING, IT GROWS IMPATIENT WITH LEAD TIMES.

3.A(5) MISSION ASSESSMENT OF FORCE SUITABILITY. CURRENT FORCE
STRUCTURE IS REASONABLE AND COMPATIBLESWITH THAT ASPECT OF U.S.
INTERESTS DEALING WITH CAPABILITY FOR CONTRIBUTING TO COLLECTIVE
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. EVEN WITH THE AIR DEFENSE COMPONENTS IT
LACKS, IT WOULD NOT POSE AN OFFENSIVE THREAT TO ANY OF ITS
NEIGHBORS. SHOULD CURRENT EXTREMISTS ACTIONS LEAD TO SERIOUS
CIVIL UNREST, INTERNAL SECURITY RESOURCES MIGHT HAVE A HARD
TIME CONTAINING IT. WE SEE EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION AS A NORMAL
DESIRE, BUT NOT ONE WHOSE SATISFACTION IN ALL AREAS AT THIS
JUNCTURE IS ESSENTIAL FOR CONTINUING EFFECTIVENESS, NOR ONE
STIMULATED BY ANY AGGRESSIVE INTENT.

E.A(6) ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE SPENDING.
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUDGET FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1978 IS RATHER
STRAIGHTFORWARD. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF $58.5 MILLION
CONSTITUTE 6.2 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES,
LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF THE GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT. THESE PROPORTIONS ARE PROBABLY WELL BELOW THE AVERAGE
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FOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THE EXPENDITURES DO NOT
CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS BURDEN UPON THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE
ECONOMY OR A SERIOUS DRAIN UPON FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES.
THE COMPOSITION OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY $11
MILLION FOR INVESTMENT AND SLIGHTLY OVER $2 MILLION FOR SCHOOL
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE SERVICES. A MAJORITY OF THE EXPENDITURES
UNDER INVESTMENT ARE FOR HIGHWAY DEVELOPMENT. BECAUSE THE
MILITARY BUDGET IS RATHER THOROUGHLY OUTLINED IN THE OVERALL
BUDGET DOCUMENT, BREAKOUT OF SPECIFIC ITEMS IS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER,
THERE IS NO INDICATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS, NOR THE
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS WHICH MILITARY GOODS REPRESENT. IN
THE CONTEXT OF HISTORIC HIGHS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS BY
THE CENTRAL BANK, THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.

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DEPARTMENT PASS USAID AND ACDA

3.A(7)(8) AND (9) PROJECTED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES DESIRED.
THE GOG WANTS TO RENEW PARTICIPATION IN IMET
AT THE PREVIOUS (FY77) LEVEL OF $500,000. A GOG REQUEST FOR
READMISSION TO IMET (LEVEL UNSPECIFIED) IS CURRENTLY UNDER
WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION. WE HAVE PROPOSED $250,000 FOR FY 79.
IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (SPECIFIC FY TIMEFRAMES DIFFICULT TO
GAUGE WE EXCEPT THE GOG TO SEEK PURCHASE, POSSIBLY FROM US, OF
LIMITED QUANTITIES OF THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF EQUIPMENT:

A. INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT - IN SMALL QUANTITY (WE RECENTLY
TURNED DOWN REQUEST FOR SIX F-5 E/F'S) TO LESSEN PERCEPTIONS OF
DEFENSELESSNESS FROM THE AIR AND LOW RANK AMONG CENTRAL AMERICAN
AIR FORCES.

B. TRAINER AIRCRAFT - IN RESPONSE TO A BACKLOG OF DEMAND FOR
PILOTS, THE HIGH COST OF FMS CASH TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES
AND DISSATISFACTION WITH THIRD-COUNTRY PILOT TRAINING PROGRAMS,
THE GOG SEES ITSELF OBLIGED TO BEGIN ITS OWN BASIC FLIGHT TRAINING
PROGRAM. (AVILABILITY OF IMET COULD ATTENUATE THIS REQUIREMENT.)

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C. ARMORED CARS - TO EQUIP EXISTING RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES
AND REPLACE WWII VINTAGE EQUIPMENT.

D. 105 MM HOWITZERS - TO REPLACE 75 MM PACK HOWITZERS FOR WHICH
AMMUNITION IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE.

E. ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS - TO PROVIDE DEFENSE FOR PRIMARY
AIRFIELD, SOMETHING NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ALREADY HAVE.

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F. LIGHT MACHINE-GUNS AND MORTARS - TO REPLACE WWII VINTAGE EQUIPMENT.

G. PATROL BOATS - PURCHASES IN THE 65 TO 100-FOOT CLASS, PROBABLY FROM U.S. COMMERCIAL SOURCES OR ISRAEL, TO AUGMENT MEAGER COASTAL PATROL CAPBILITY. NAVAL ARMAMENT, PROBABLY RAPID FIRE 30 MM MOUNTS, ARE BEING SOUGHT FROM U.S. AND FOREIGN SOURCES FOR INSTALLATION ON SOME PRESENT BOATS AND FUTURE PURCHASES.

WE EXPECT THESE CONTEMPLATED PURCHASES TO BE SPREAD OUT, NOT TO REQUIRE CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS, AND NOT TO PLACE UNDUE STRAIN ON ECONOMY. IN THE PAST WE COULD AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME THE GOG WOULD COME TO U.S. FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT. AS A RESULT OF UNHAPPY PAST EXPERIENCE WITH US, AWARENESS OF OUR CURRENT ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, RELUCTANCE TO FACE POSSIBLE REFUSALS AND, IN SOME CASES, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES OFFERED BY ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS, THE GOG NOW DEMONSTRATES A WILLINGNESS TO LOOK TO THIRD COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH STILL PREFERRING U.S. PRODUCTS.

3.A(10) ARMS CONTROL IMPACT. NONE OF THE CONTEMPLATED ITEMS WOULD MATERIALLY AFFECT REGIONAL STABILITY OR INTRODUCE NEW CAPABILITIES INTO THE AREA.

3.A(11) HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSION.
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A. GUATEMALA FALLS INTO A HUMAN RIGHTS "GRAY AREA" WHICH RESISTS SIMPLE ANALYSIS. CIVIL LIBERITES AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE, FOR THE MOST PART, RESPECTED; THE PRESS IS FREER FROM INHIBITION THAN MOST. INDEED, THE LAUERUD ADMINISTRATION CAME UNDER HEAVY CRITICISM IN ITS LAST YEAR FOR REFRAINING FROM USING AVAILABLE LEGAL MEASURES AGAINST ILLEGAL STRIKES AND OTHER PROTEST MOVEMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, VIOLENT DEATH IS A COMMONPLACE AND THE GOVERNMENT, AT MINIMUM, HAS BEEN LESS THAN VIGOROUS IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE PHENOMENON OF UNEXPLAINED DISAPPEARANCES. BUT EVEN GOVERNMENT OPPONENTS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SUBSTANTIATE MOST CHARGES OF OFFICIAL CONNIVANCE IN REPRESSION. AT THIS WRITING THE NEW LUCAS GOVERNMENT IS BUT A MONTH OLD. IT HAS GIVEN VERBAL SUPPORT TO HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES, BUT PERFORMANCE REMAINS TO BE TESTED.

B. WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT OUTSIDE VIEWS TO OVERRIDE WHAT THE GUATEMALAN LEADERSHIP OF THE MOVEMENT MAY CONSIDER TO BE DOMESTIC IMPERATIVES, AND NOTHING WE HAVE SEEN LEADS US TO ATTACH HEAVY HUMAN RIGHTS LEVERAGE TO OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE STANCE IN GUATEMALA. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT IN MARCH 1977 GUATEMALA UNILATERALLY RENOUNCED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PREDICTED ON U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. THE GUATEMALAN ACTION IS GRATUITOUS. IT OCCURRED DESPITE THE

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PROBABILITY THAT GUATEMALAN HUMEN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE, AS REFLECTED IN THE REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ALREADY PUBLISHED, WAS NOT SUCH AS TO DICTATE ELIMINATION OR IMPORTANT REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE LEVELS. THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY'S GENERALLY ACCURATE PERCEPTION THAT OUR BELIZE CONCERNS TEND TO OVERSHADOW OTHERS IN SHAPING ARMS POLICY DECISIONS TOWARD GUATEMALA (INCLUDING CONTINUING CASH TRANSACTIONS), ALSO REMAINS THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVE-NESS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE REPRISALS IN THE NAME OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

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DEPARTMENT PASS USAID AND ACDA

C. THE MILITARY ARE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE IN THIS AS IN PAST GOVERNMENTS. PRESIDENT LUCAS IS HEMSELF A FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE. WE CAN THEREFORE EXPECT A RESTRICTIVE ARMS TRANSFER POLICY TO COLOR MANY ASPECTS OF THE USG-GOG RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING OUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN ACCESS AND HEARING FOR OUR HUMAN RIGHTS VIEWS. IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, CONTINUATION OF FMS CASH SALES AND RESUMPTION OF IMET WOULD HELP US MAINTAIN LINKAGES TO THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY, WITHOUT IDENTIFYING US TOO CLOSELY WITH A GOVERNMENT WHICH, AT BEST, IS NOT ABOUT TO TURN GUATEMALA, A COUNTRY WITH A HIGH LEVEL OF CIVIL TENSION, INTO ANOTHER COSTA RICA.

3.A(12) ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES

A. ECONOMIC - GUATEMALA RECEIVED ABOUT $150 MILLION (LOANS AND GRANTS) IN CY 1977. LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BROUGHT THE TOTAL UP FROM A RECENT YEARLY AVERAGE OF ABOUT $100 MILLION.

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B. MILITARY - THIRD COUNTRIES HAVE SOLD GUATEMALA SOME $28 MILLION IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN RECENT YEARS. THE LARGEST
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ITEMS WERE STOL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND RIFLES FROM ISRAEL; AMMUNITION FROM KOREA, PORTUGAL, BELGIUM AND TAIWAN; AND HELICOPTERS FROM FRANCE. WE DO NOT KNOW THE FINANCIAL TERMS OF THESE SALES AND THUS TO WHAT DEGREE THEY MIGHT BE CONSIDERED "ASSISTANCE." MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS WEST GERMANY, FRANCE, ISRAEL, SPAIN AND TAIWAN, HAVE FURNISHED TRAINING.

3.A (13) CONSIDERATION OF ASSISTANCE LEVELS (DOLS 000)

	IMET			FMS FINANCING			MAP		
	80	81	82	80	81	82	80	81	82
(A) LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM)	125	125	125	-	-	-	-	-	-
(B) LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE)	250	250	250	-	-	-	-	-	-
(C) LEVEL 3 (CURRENT)	500	500	500	-	-	-	-	-	-

(D) INCRE-MENTAL LEVEL: NOT CONTEMPLATED

(E) DISCUSSION

GUATEMALA REJECTED MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR FY 78 CONDITIONED UPON SUBMISSION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO CONGRESS. THE IMET PROGRAM GUATEMALA HAD PROPOSED FOR FY 78 TOTALLED $500,000, THE GENERAL LEVEL OF PREVIOUS YEARS. SINCE GUATEMALA HAS INDICATED IT WANTS TO RESUME IMET, WE ARE USING THE $500,000 FIGURE AS IF IT WERE THE CURRENT LEVEL. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED ONLY $250,000 FOR FY 79, A PARTIAL PROGRAM, BECAUSE OF THE LATENESS OF THE REQUEST IN TERMS OF OUR OWN BUDGETING AND BECAUSE THE GOG
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ALREADY HAS SOME TRAINING COMMITMENTS ELSEWHERE. (RESUMPTION OF IMET FOLLOWS A "GOALS AND OBJECTIVES" RECOMMENDATION. WE HAVE PROJECTED FMS CREDITS AT ZERO FOR ALL LEVELS AND ALL YEARS SINCE THE GOG HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION IT WISHES TO RESUME DREDITS. WE SEE NO INTEREST SERVED AT THIS TIME IN ENCOURAGING A CHANGE.

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LEVEL 3 WOULD ENABLE GUATEMALA TO RETURN TO THE TRAINING PROGRAM EXISTING BEFORE ITS UNILATERAL REJECTION OF ASSISTANCE. THIS WOULD INCLUDE FOUR OFFICERS YEARLY TO U.S. COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSES, THREE TO PILOT/HELICOPTER TRAINING AND OTHERS TO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT COURSES. THE BULK OF THE PROGRAM WOULD CONSIST OF SPECIALIZED TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL, LARGELY IN CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS. CUSTOMARILY THE GOG HAS SPENT ITS TRAINING MONEY CAREFULLY AND SELECTED ITS MOST PROMISING PERSONNEL FOR US SCHOOLING. THESE PERSONNEL HELP INFUSE A PRO-AMERICAN ORIENTATION INTO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, PROVIDE LINKAGES AND ACCESS, AND OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR CREATING UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHY FOR OUR HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS. DENIAL OF THESE MODEST TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE GROWING RESENTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE INFLUENTIAL OFFICER CORPS.

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LEVEL 2 REPRESENTS HALF THE NORMAL PROGRAM. IT WOULD REMAIN A SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING GENERALIZED GOOD WILL, BUT WOULD OFFER FEWER OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPING LINKAGES WITH POTENTIAL FUTURE LEADERS OR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONARY WORK. THIS IS BECAUSE THE GOG WOULD LIKELY GIVE PRIORITY WITHIN ITS IMET ALLOCATION TO TECHNICAL TRAINING REQUIRED FOR OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF US EQUIPMENT. OFFICER DEVELOPMENT IN OUR PROGRAM WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE SHORT SHRIFT. THE PRICING OF THE VARIOUS COURSES WOULD

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DOUBTLESS HAVE SOME EFFECT ON THE TRAINING MIX. ANOTHER
FACTOR IS THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT TRAVEL EXPENSES TO THE
SOUTHER UNITED STATES ARE ABOUT THE SAME AS TO PANAMA. AT
LEVEL 2 GUATEMALA WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK TRAINING FROM A VARIETY
OF THIRD COUNTRIES (SEE 3.A(12)), PERHAPS AS MUCH AS IN
FY 78 BECAUSE CANCELLATION OF FY 78 IMET LEFT SOME TRAINING
BACKLOG. ALTHOUGH IT MAY ATTEMPT TO GIVE ITSELF A BASIC FLIGHT
TRAINING CAPABILITY, THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY, OPERATING AS IT
DOES ON A RELATIVELY LIMITED BUDGET, HAS LITTLE CAPACITY OT
COMPENSATE FOR REDUCED IMET WITH INCREASED SELF-SUFFICIENCY,
PARTICULARLY IRISPECIALIZED, TECHNICAL AREAS.
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WE VENTURE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES MAY SUFFER
BY THE ORIENTATION RECEIVED BY GUATEMALAN TRAINEES IN SUCH
COUNTRIES AS ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CHILE.

LEVEL 1 IS ARBITRARILY SELECTED AT HALF OF LEVEL 2, BUT WE
BELIEVE TAT LESSER AMOUNTS WOULD LACK ANY USEFUL SYMBOLISM AND
THUS YIELD LITTLE IN TERMS OF LINKAGES AND ACCESS. THIS OR
LOWER LEVELS OF IMET MIGHT RELUCTANTLY INDUCE FMS CASH PURCHASE
OF THE MOST ESSENTIAL TRAINING; BECAUSE TRAINING ON THIS BASIS
IS VERY EXPENSIVE, THE GUATEMALAN DEFENSE BUDGET MIGHT HAVE TO BE
INCREASED TO COVER IT. IMPACT ON U.S. OBJECTIVES ANDSINTERESTS FOLLOW
S
LINES OF REASONING EXPLORED FOR LEVELS 2 AND 3.

3.A(13(F)) MILGP MANNING LEVELS. GUATEMALA IS AUTHORIZED A SECURITY
ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION, PER FAA SECTION 515(C). WE SEE NO REALISTIC
"INTERMEDIATE" MANNING LEVEL BETWEEN LEVELS 1 AND 3, BELOW:

	U.S.MIL	U.S.CIV	LWR
LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM)	3	0	3
LEVEL 3 (CURRENT)	4	0	3

UNDER LEVEL 1, AN ARMY COLONEL WOULD REPRESENT DOD ON ALL
SECURITY ASSISTANCE MATTERS AND SERVE AS ITS ADVISOR TO THE
CHIEF OF MISSION. ASSISTING HIM WOULD BE ONE OFFICER TO MANAGE
THE TRAINING PROGRAM (FMS, IMET OR COMBINATION) AND
REPRESENT USAF; AND ONE OFFICER TO MANAGE THE FMS MATERIAL PROGRAM.
THE THREE LWR'S PERFORM CLERICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS,
MANY OF WHICH PREVIOUSLY WERE PERFORMED BY NCO'S.
LEVEL 3 ADDS A NAVAL OFFICER TO SERVE AS PROGRAM
LIAISON WITH GUATEMALA'S FORMATIVE NAVY. LOCATION OF NAVAL
HEADQUARTERS AND BASES SOME DISTANCE FROM CAPITAL CITY MAKES
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THIS FUNCTION TIME-CONSUMING. WE UNDERSTAND THAT
THIS CURRENT MANNING LEVEL IS ALREADY THE LOWEST IN LATIN AMERICA.

OUR INTENTION IS EVENTUALLY TO STAFF AT LEVEL 1.

3.A(13(H)) IMET DESCRIPTION. IMET PROGRAM FOR GUATEMALA
NORMALLY COMPRISES FIVE STUDENTS FOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER
TRAINING COURSES AND 140 TECHNICAL TRAINEES, MOST OF THE
TECHNICAL TRAINING TAKES PLACE IN THE CANAL ZONE.
IMET TRAINING IS PREFERRED BY GUATEMALA BECAUSE SUITABLE TRAINING
IS UNAVAILABLE LOCALLY, IT IS SEEN AS SUPERIOR TO THIRD-COUNTRY
TRAINING, AND THE COST OF U.S. TRAINING ON AN FMS CASH BASIS
IS OFTEN REGARDED AS PROHIBITIVE. PARAGRAPH 3.A(13(E)),
ABOVE, CONTAINS ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION.

3.A(13)(I) AMBASSADOR'S BEST ESTIMATE OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
000 DOLS)

	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
MAP	---	---	---
FMS FINANCING	---	---	---
IMET	500	500	500

BOSTER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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Disposition Remarks:
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Drafter: n/a
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Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780316-0390
Format: TEL
From: GUATEMALA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197808113/aaaadrdl.tel
Line Count: 573
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Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
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Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1581589
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED SECURITY ASSISTANCE ASSESSMENT: GUATEMALA
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX, GR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d3336b59-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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